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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the representation of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict – between August 
1945 and December 1949 – within the American media. In contrast with the popular belief 
of a consistent and principled anti-colonialist approach, current research establishes that the 
terms in which the press portrayed the conflict were not only developing over time but, in 
addition, were to a great extent dependent on pragmatic interests rather than idealistic 
beliefs. Studying media coverage parallel to U.S. policy-making will furthermore show that 
the press provided the parameters for the State Department’s actions.  
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I. Introduction 
In May 1949 Dutch intelligence in the Republic of Indonesia reported on ‘objectionable 
American activities’, elaborating that ‘certain American journalists are regarded as pro-
Indonesian.’1 In response to this announcement, the intelligence services briefly considered 
to expel all American journalists from the archipelago. The U.S.-based public relations firm 
Swanson & Co, however, declared that American journalists, being distrustful of every 
government imposing constraints, could under no circumstance accept a restriction to their 
privileges or freedom of movement. The government in the Netherlands had to respect this 
proposition since, as the agency articulated, American public opinion was of profound 
importance to The Hague.2  
The complex Dutch-Indonesian conflict, transpiring between 17 August 1945 and 
December 1949, had more players than the two directly opposing parties. The Netherlands 
conceived of the archipelago as indispensible for its own prestigious and economic survival; 
and the Indonesian nationalists, certainly after living through Japanese occupation, stiffened 
their resolve to obtain unconditional independence. In the immediate post-Second World 
War era, however, the leading powers of the United States and the Soviet Union – and 
notably the Cold War fought between the two – determined much of the international 
relations. The United States in particular had a profound impact on the developments and 
outcome of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. 3  Accordingly, the Netherlands and the 
Indonesian nationalists vied for American sympathy, expecting that, if backed by 
Washington, they would be able to realize their aims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 L. Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, Militairen versus media in Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1949 (Zutphen 2013) 305. 
2 Idem. 
3 H.W. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië. De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Amsterdam 2001) 371-382. 
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As above anecdote reveals, the press was an essential medium through which both 
parties endeavored to win United States’ approval. Current research sets out to determine 
what terminology was used to portray the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and how these 
depictions evolved overtime. This thesis will additionally argue that the American media to a 
large extent determined the parameters of the State Department’s foreign policies and, 
consequently, the developments and final outcome of the conflict. Thus, whereas the 
historian Louis Zweers in his recent publication The censored war contends that ‘the world 
press assumed an anti-Dutch attitude’4, and that American correspondents insisted on the 
claim that European colonialism was all but a bygone practice, this research intends to 
establish that the reportage was far from unequivocally and continuously opposed to either 
the Netherlands’ conduct of affairs or colonialism writ large. In the same vein this research is 
at variance with Odd Arne Westad’s assumption, coined in his landmark political analysis The 
global cold war, that ‘after World War II any attempts to defy local nationalism by bankrupt, 
inefficient European governments…simply did not make sense to Washington.’5 Westad 
continues that, in the case of the Netherlands, ‘the Truman administration was quick to pull 
the plug on whatever aspirations its government may have had to settle its colonial problem 
by force.’6 The media, however, illustrate that the contrary was true. Even after the Dutch 
launch of a military operation, the U.S. government was reluctant to take a stance in the 
debate – let alone act decisively on the Netherlands’ aggression. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 187. Translation from Dutch: ‘(Inderdaad) had de wereldpers een anti-
Nederlandse houding aangenomen.’ 
5 O.A. Westad, The global cold war. Third world interventions and the making of our times (Cambridge and New York 
2005) 112-113. 
6 Ibidem, 114. 
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II. Methodology 
To sensibly structure and analyze four years worth of newspapers is a daunting task. Political 
scientist Kai Oppermann, who examined the construction of public images within the 
written media, provides a practical solution. Although his study is of a different nature and 
grounded within a different discipline (i.e. political science), his modus operandi and 
justification of sources is nonetheless transferrable. Oppermann limits himself to the study 
of two media outlets: namely, the New York Times and the Washington Post, arguing that these 
newspapers are, and have been, the two foremost opinion leaders within the field of foreign 
affairs. The New York Times is not only the daily with the most extensive foreign affairs 
coverage: the newspaper also functions as a major agenda-setter for other print media, and 
has proved to be influential in guiding American public opinion. The Washington Post, in turn, 
is allegedly the second most important source for (local and national) media outlets in terms 
of foreign affairs coverage. Equally notable is that, over the years, the Washington Post has 
demonstrated to have a disproportionate impact on decision-makers in the American 
capital.7 
Hence this project, too, will be limited to a study of the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, in the confidence that, although it might not cover the entire spectrum of 
opinions, these two media sources will represent the most substantial share of (U.S.) input 
and perspectives on matters of foreign policy in general and on the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict specifically. The current research’s findings will be a fair indicator of the overall 
pattern in the media reporting on the issue. 
When proceeding to the methods of analysis, one should distinguish between and 
make use of both a quantitative and a qualitative study of sources. A quantitative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 K. Oppermann, ‘The public images of Britain, Germany, and France in the United States’, Journal of 
Transatlantic Studies 9:4 (2012) 305-325. 
 7 
examination of the two media outlets will contain a survey of when heightened attention 
towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict occurs; with which events or political discussions this 
intensified attention correlates; how the interest in the subject fluctuates; and a comparison 
of the relative attention paid to the Dutch-Indonesian episode in The New York Times on the 
one hand and the Washington Post on the other. These modes of quantitative analysis are 
fruitful in establishing the salience of a topic and to what extent the conflict is ‘primed’. 
Priming constitutes the (unconscious) impact of a communication in terms of directing 
attention to a subject or perspective such as a foreign policy. It helps determine ‘what gets to 
the “top of the head”’.8 
It is only thereafter that we will turn to the qualitative component of analysis, 
studying, in addition to its frequency, the actual contents of the coverage. The most coherent 
manner in which to review the reporting on the conflict is by determining the dominant 
‘frames’ in which the events are made intelligible. A frame can be understood as the central 
organizing idea or storyline within a mode of communication, which serves as a conceptual 
tool that people rely upon in order to convey, interpret and evaluate information. ‘Frames’ as 
Powlick and Katz summarize, ‘help receivers of information define problems, diagnose 
causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.’9 The public must, in one way or 
another, be receptive to the framework in which a narrative is molded. Zweers, for example, 
refers to the (pro-Indonesian) frame of anti-colonialism, appealing to the – alleged – 
American ideal of self-determination. But a frame does not necessarily correspond with a 
perceived shared value: a frame, to name just some examples, can also constitute a certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 J.H. Aldrich, ‘Foreign policy and the electoral connection’, Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006) 486. 
9 P.J. Powlick, and A.Z. Katz, ‘Defining the American public opinion/foreign policy nexus’, Mershon 
International Studies Review 42:1 (1998) 36. 
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historical conjuncture; a national interest; or a deep-rooted fear and a concomitant call for 
domestic security.  
In the succeeding chapters, all commencing with a brief outline of events as 
recounted in Kahin, Reid and Vickers, this thesis will thus proceed to examine the salience 
of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in the two American media outlets, and the frameworks 
within which the conflict was presented.10 These findings, in turn, will be analyzed in parallel 
with the U.S. foreign policies vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian question, as drawn up by 
McMahon, Gouda and Zaalberg, and Roadnight.11  
The succeeding chapters will be divided into three – chronologically ordered – 
sections: the first section covers the Indonesian proclamation of independence, on 17 
August 1945, until the departure of the British troops in November 1946; the following 
section, commencing in December 1946, treats the timespan from the Linggadjati agreement 
until the eve of the second Dutch aggression; and the third section continues with the 
second military operation and concludes with the ‘official’ Indonesian independence in 
December 1949. This chronological examination of sources will shed light on the 
developments in the media attention with regard to the dispute. 	  	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca 1952); A. Reid, The Indonesian national revolution, 
1945-1950 (Hawthorn and Melbourne 1974); A. Vickers, A history of modern Indonesia (Cambridge and New York 
2005). 
11 R.J. McMahon, Colonialism and cold war. The United States and the struggle for Indonesian independence, 1945-1949 
(Ithaca and London 1981); F. Gouda and T.B. Zaalberg, American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: 
US foreign policy and Indonesian nationalism, 1920-1949 (Amsterdam 2002); A. Roadnight, United States policy towards 
Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower years (Hampshire and New York 2002). 
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1. August 1945 – November 1946 
1.1 Historical context 
The Indonesian proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, two days after the 
Japanese surrender, caused considerable consternation – fronted by The Hague – among the 
international community. Information about and comprehension of the situation in the 
Dutch East Indies was remarkably restricted. Indonesian nationalism, which in fact had been 
occurring for decades and again gained momentum during the 1940s, was played down in 
the Netherlands as a byproduct of Japanese occupation – a narrative heedlessly adopted by 
the Allies. The Hague denounced the frontmen of the Indonesian Republic (notably Sukarno 
and Hatta) as collaborators, and the Dutch government lent no credence whatsoever to the 
aptitude of the nationalist leadership.12 
In August 1945, the Dutch and British governments reached a consensus concerning 
the prospect of a transitional phase in which the de facto command of the Netherlands East 
Indies would reside with Allied forces. 13 The British Southeast Asia Command was assigned 
with the tasks of disarming and repatriating the Japanese; liberating and evacuating the Allied 
internees; and the maintenance of law and order across the region during this period of 
transition.14 In their attempt to counterbalance the Republican leadership, Dutch officers 
erected federal governments in the regions where the Republic was not in power, venturing 
to restore – if only in part – the prewar status quo. The Dutch governor general Hubertus van 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Reid, Indonesian national revolution, 42-43. 
13 M. Frey, ‘The Indonesian revolution and the fall of the Dutch empire. Actors, factors and strategy’, in M. 
Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong ed., The transformation of Southeast Asia. International perspectives on decolonization 
(New York and London 2003) 87.  
14 Reid, Indonesian national revolution, 45-46. 
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Mook, yielding to a strategy of decentralization, advocated for the ‘rapid consolidation of an 
economically important area with a population which is still well disposed.’15 
Meanwhile the objective of self-determination had taken root in Indonesia, but 
disagreement over how sovereignty was to be obtained divided the nationalist community. 
The European-educated elite, who had managed to establish a Republican government with 
the tacit permission of the Japanese occupier, was willing to compromise and give their 
consent to a transitional period of cooperation with the Netherlands. This route of 
diplomacy stood in sharp contrast with the struggle ideal of non-cooperation. A diversity of 
struggle groups, assembled along regional, religious and ideological lines, aimed for 
immediate independence through (guerrilla) warfare. The Javanese cities of Surabaya and 
Bandung – among a dozen other regions – became the sites of explosive conflict.16 
 
1.2. American views  
The U.S. State Department proved unable to generate much sympathy for the Indonesian 
nationalist movements in the months following the capitulation of Japan. The government’s 
outlook on the Indonesian question was determined by in the first place domestic interests 
and, not unimportantly, perceived Dutch-American ties. American stakes in the Netherlands 
East Indies were twofold: the United States nurtured a close commercial relationship with 
the area, having, as the then Secretary of State Cordell Hull depicted, ‘a substantial interest in 
the maintenance of the principle and practice of equality of opportunity and enterprise’ 
through the 250 million dollar worth of investments in the region.17 The archipelago was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Van Mook quoted in Reid, Indonesian national revolution, 104-105. 
16 Ibidem, 23-31. 
17 Hull quoted in Roadnight, United States foreign policy towards Indonesia, 2. 
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furthermore of strategic interest, providing not only a sizable market for American export 
products, but being also an indispensible source of commodities as rubber and tin. 
In addition to the above origins of American national interest in the Southeast Asian 
region, the bond between the Netherlands and the United States proved of equal importance 
in the manner the U.S. dealt with the Dutch-Indonesian question. The Dutch people had 
been regarded as a formidable ally during the Second World War, and a bold source of 
resistance against German subjugation; but president Roosevelt’s heritage, rooted partly in 
the Low Countries, gave also rise to the sense of a natural alliance. More pivotal, however, 
was the fact that the U.S. was currying favor on the continent in its tenacious attempt to 
guard Europe against the expansion of communism. 18 
Another factor, apart from American stakes in the Netherlands East Indies and the 
idea of Dutch-American amity, was the blunt naiveté – or rather blinkered view – that 
persisted in the United States, undoubtedly enforced by domestic interests and the 
conception of interlinked fates. The U.S. State Department was blinded by the vague pledges 
made by Dutch Queen Wilhelmina and the notion that ‘the prosperity of [the Netherlands 
and the Netherlands East Indies] is indivisible.’19 Confidence in the Netherlands’ sincere and 
progressive outlook towards their subjects in Indonesia obscured that, in fact, Dutch 
colonialism was more conventional than the United States at the time would have liked to 
believe.20 
The reliance on Dutch accounts about the state of affairs in the Netherlands East 
Indies stemmed from the absence of American intelligence in the region and inevitably 
resulted in a fairly distorted perspective. The United States underestimated the prevalence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Gouda and Zaalberg, American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, 19. 
19 Queen Wilhelmina quoted in P. S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia (London and New York 1950) 26-28. 
20 McMahon, Colonialism and cold war, 63-65. 
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Indonesian nationalism and the impact the Japanese occupation had had on both the 
widening and deepening of the nationalist’ movement.  
The U.S. State Department surmised that American objectives in Indonesia would be 
best served in a solid and constant environment. A revival of European imperialism, and the 
consequential restoration of Dutch sovereignty in the Netherlands East Indies, would 
assumedly safeguard this aspiration of permanent stability. Reinforcement, however, of 
Dutch colonial control, was irreconcilable with the United States’ championed ideal of ‘self-
determination for all people’, emanating from the American revolution and embedded in the 
popular terminology of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point speech and the more recent 
Atlantic charter. Thus, the U.S. State Department felt coerced to announce that the ‘United 
States policy is one of non-intervention in the Indies but favors, in principle . . . self-
government as the [eventual] goal.’21 The U.S. pronouncement of non-intervention, by which 
the Truman administration sidestepped the responsibility for the implementation of a – with 
the Indonesian nationalists – unpopular stratagem, translated into subcontracting the 
regulation of their official policies to London, via the British-led South East Asian 
Command.22  
The coverage of the Dutch-Indonesian question was relatively limited in the period 
between August 1945 and November 1946; the amount of articles in the New York Times 
added up to 467 with an average of twenty-nine news-items a month, which number lies well 
below the four-year average of forty-five monthly pieces. The peak of attention within this 
timespan arrived between October 1945 and February 1946, when the median number of 
articles fluctuated between forty-seven and sixty-five items each month. The amount of 
front-page articles for the entire period was sixty-three, and the distribution of these items 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibidem, 8. 
22 Gouda and Zaalberg, American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, 30. 
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correlated roughly with the overall body of articles concerning the Dutch-Indonesian issue, 
reaching its summit between October and December 1945, with an average of ten monthly 
accounts featuring on the front-page.  
 Two New York Times’ correspondents visited Java over the course of this sixteen-
month period. The first to land in Indonesia was the reporter Ralph Coniston, who 
provided, between December 1945 and February 1946, nine articles from his temporary base 
in Batavia (current-day Jakarta). In October and November 1946, when coverage of the 
Dutch-Indonesian situation again steadily intensified, the journalist Robert Trumbull 
produced seventeen stories on location. Most items during this period, however, were 
fashioned by the news agencies United Press and Associated Press, who in turn relied heavily on 
British and Dutch intelligence or spokesmen in the region. 
Within the same timespan the Washington Post published only one third of the amount 
of articles appearing in the New York Times. While the four-year average amounted to 
approximately fifteen articles per month, over the course of this first stage of Dutch-
Indonesian conflict the average hovered around ten monthly items – with some heightened 
attention between October and December 1946. The zenith of interest in the Indonesian 
question occurred in October 1945, when the Washington Post issued thirteen cover stories.  
Not only was this daily’s coverage of the Indonesian question limited; due to the 
absence of Washington Post correspondents in the region all information derived from 
secondary sources, predominantly the United Press and Associated Press. Given that the New 
York Times acquired most of its items from the same news agencies, the narrative and 
terminology in both newspapers are virtually identical – save for the contribution of the 
latter’s Java-based reporters. The qualitative examination within this chapter will therefore be 
limited to the New York Times’ contents. Only one (Associated Press) correspondent whose 
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articles were published by the Washington Post reported directly from the region. Ralph 
Morton appeared a mere three times in the American daily, with one article devoted to the 
killing and terrorizing by Javanese ‘extremists’; in another, he expressed his disquiet over 
American economic interests in the archipelago; and the third item was published under the 
very telling heading of ‘Java rebels: not boys, but look it’.23 
Against the backdrop of the United States’ tacit approval of the Netherlands’ status 
quo ante, it is hardly surprising that the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 by 
the Indonesian nationalist leadership passed unnoticed in the (major) American print media. 
Neither on the 18th of August, nor during the subsequent days did this – for Indonesia very 
memorable – day receive a paragraph of attention.  
The first time the Dutch-Indonesian question – although very implicitly – was 
mentioned in the New York Times was on 10 September 1945, when the American 
correspondent to Japan W.H. Lawrence reported on (Dutch) Allied soldiers who, after taken 
captive by Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies, lost their lives during the 
Nagasaki bombings. The framework was very much determined by the Second World War 
binary: the spectrum comprised the victimized Allies on the one side, and Japanese 
‘bestiality’ on the other, without a remark on the large (native Japanese) majority of 
casualties.24 
A more direct allusion to the Dutch-Indonesian problem was made on 22 September 
1945 in an article titled ‘No. 1 problem of Asia’. The item was the poster child for 
Washington’s position at the time. It started with the idea that Japan ‘destroyed the myth of 
invincibility of the white man’, and that the problem of imperialism must be solved ‘to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 R. Morton, ‘British troops rush to quell Java uprisings’, Washington Post, 18 October 1945; ‘Java’s uprisings 
involves U.S. firms, trade’, WP, 28 October 1945; ‘Java rebels: not boys, but look it’, WP, 2 December 1945. 
24 W. H. Lawrence, ‘Atom bomb killed Nagasaki captives’, New York Times, 10 September 1945. 
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satisfaction of these [Southeast Asian] peoples, if there is to be real hope of peace and 
progress in that area of the world.’ The author then proceeded with stating that, at the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 
international community reached a successful compromise: the Netherlands promised to 
‘educate’ the Indonesian peoples towards partial self-rule, which could eventually culminate 
in a dominion status. As the author explained, all people have a right to freedom, but 
sovereignty cannot and should not be obtained overnight. The ‘perfect example’ was the way 
the United States dealt with the Filipinos, who were gradually instructed in the conduct of 
self-government, but who remained attached to the United States with a great number of 
strings. ‘And’, as the reporter propagated, ‘what a reward of loyalty and cooperation was 
harvested [from the Philippines] in the years of war!’25 
The actual spur of attention on Indonesia commenced, as stated earlier, in October 
1945, and lasted until February 1946. The first months of coverage were determined by the 
explosive situation in the Javanese cities of Surabaya, Semarang and Bandung. The struggle 
was generally portrayed as warfare between ‘native extremists’26 whose nationalism was 
fabricated and fuelled by the Japanese occupier, and the ‘righteous, Allied troops’ who took 
up arms only in self-defense, but who had the overall peaceful mission to restore ‘law and 
order’.27 
Especially in the first three weeks of October, the correspondents evoked the idea 
that the ‘Javanese rebels’ were waging a ‘Holy War’. The Indonesian paper Merdeka was 
reported to have appealed to the Moslem population in support of the ‘so-called Indonesian 
Republic’, as the newly proclaimed state was persistently – and almost mockingly – referred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ‘No. 1 problem of Asia’, NYT, 22 September 1945. 
26 Other oft-used terms to denote the ‘extremists’ or ‘extremism’ were: ‘terrorists’, ‘savage attacks’, ‘Javanese 
hotheads’, ‘unruly mobs’, etc. 
27 For example: ‘British threaten attack in Java, as Surabaya mob kills generals’, NYT, 31 October 1945. 
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to in the New York Times accounts.28 Sukarno’s name first surfaced mid-October, when he 
was denoted as the ‘Japanese appointed head of the’ again ‘so-called Indonesian Republic.’29 
According to the British general Christison, Sukarno was the person responsible for the 
violent insurgencies.30 In these early days of the revolution the correspondents were unable 
to differentiate between the Indonesian Republic and its leadership on the one hand and the 
diffuse, heterogeneous struggle groups on the other. All nationalist tendencies were equated 
to an infantile and Japanese-inspired disobedience.  
Only from late October onwards, when news about negotiations between the 
conflicting   parties gained momentum, was the Republican leadership invested with a degree 
of credibility. ‘The Republic’ was still preceded by ‘so-called’, ‘self-proclaimed’, or in some 
instances plainly ‘unrecognized’; but Sukarno and Hatta were considered as fairly apt and 
well disposed representatives. The torchbearers of the Indonesian Republic made an effort 
to distinguish themselves from the ‘rebellious contingents’ – and not without success. 
Sukarno was reported to have taken ‘disciplinary action against dr. Moestopo’, the instigator 
of the insurrection in Surabaya, and had ordered the cessation of all opposition directed 
against the Allies.31  
The Indonesian leadership proved willing to cooperate with the British Southeast 
Asian Command, emphasizing that not the Allied forces but the Dutch administration was 
the Republic’s chief opponent.32 The Brits, in turn, announced that they intended to employ 
a ‘hands-off policy’ in Indonesia: Prime Minister Attlee and his government were stated to 
have no ‘desire to be unnecessarily involved in the administration or in the political affairs of 	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31 ‘British threaten attack in Java, as Surabaya mob kills generals’, NYT, 31 October 1945; ‘British order Raf 
into Java clashes’, NYT, 1 November 1945. 
32 Idem. 
 17 
non-British territory’. Attlee claimed to recognize the existence and ambitions on the 
Indonesian independence movement, while being ‘careful about accepting its claims at their 
face value.’33  
News items in The New York Times frequently underlined British support for a swift 
settlement of disputes, but simultaneously conveyed that the United Kingdom regarded the 
Dutch sovereignty in the region, at least in the foreseeable future, as self-evident.34 This 
somewhat ambiguous stance was the product of Great Britain’s reluctance to wage a war for 
the Netherlands’ sake; while the other side of the coin was that, would London urge for a – 
to the nationalists’ agreeable – resolution, the perpetuation of the British colonial 
possessions would expectedly be compromised.  
Whereas the three main players – Indonesia, Great Britain and the Netherlands – 
continued to be the focal point of media attention, in November 1945 the United States was 
attributed with a minor but unwelcome part by the correspondents reporting on the 
Indonesian question. The media commented that Sukarno had appealed to the U.S. 
government to prevent Dutch forces from operating American equipment. A reporter feared 
that ‘Asiatic goodwill’ towards the U.S. would be endangered in the case the State 
Department failed to adopt a straightforward position.35 The follow-up to this item arrived 
on 14 November when journalist Lawrence wrote that Washington refrained from taking a 
stance in the Indies dispute. The U.S. State Department, however, had no reason to question 
the Netherlands’ sovereignty. According to Lawrence it was deemed evident that Japanese 
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forces were infiltrating the nationalist movements, which fact uprooted Republican claims to 
authority.36 
Aside from the American involvement in the conflict, mid-November marked the 
arrival of a new face on the platform of the Republican leadership. Sutan Sjahrir – whose 
name, as if by way of comic relief, was spelled differently daily (Sultan Sharir; Sjahira; Sultan 
Charir; Sultan Sjharir; etc.37) – was portrayed as a ‘moderate leader’ and a suitable liaison for 
the continuation of peace talks. While Sjahrir tried to distance himself from the struggle 
branches of the nationalist movement, the situation in Java grew progressively more 
precarious with the struggle groups still holding sway over vast sections of land.38 British 
intelligence, as quoted in the New York Times, declared that ‘the gloves are off’.39 
In December the New York Times’ correspondent Ralph Coniston made his entrée. 
Coniston’s reports dealt chiefly with the ‘hopeful’ negotiations between van Mook and the 
new Republican cabinet headed by Sjahrir; but he also paraphrased the General Mountbatten 
as having stressed that his operations in Indonesia followed the lines laid out by Foreign 
Minister Bevin, who recognized ‘Netherlands’ sovereignty in the Indies’.40 The British troops 
would reinstate ‘law and order’ as to allow the commencement of constitutional reforms, in 
which the Republic would be granted a measure of self-government within the parameters of 
a broader Netherlands Kingdom. With hindsight, Mountbatten’s communiqué comes across 
as a perfect repetition of U.S. State Department aims: the limited degree of ‘native 
administration’ would suffice to maintain the ideal of self-determination, while in fact the 
Netherlands could retain authority and thereby safeguard American interests. 	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Within the same month the United States was drawn back into the discourse. The 
New York Times quoted Sjahrir who, noticing the U.S. bias towards the Netherlands, 
reproached the State Department for its failure to assume a neutral position in the dispute.41 
As the New York Times allotted an increasing amount of its contents to the tense situation in 
Indonesia, the U.S. government must have felt forced to – at last – issue an official 
statement. The public announcement arrived on 20 December, when the State Department 
‘called upon the Dutch and Indonesian leaders to resume negotiations’ in hopes of a 
‘peaceful resolution’.42 The Netherlands responded three days later with the, in retrospect, 
hollow declaration that ‘nothing would be left undone’ to come up with a solution to the 
‘Indonesian problem’.43  
At the dawn of 1946 the United States was unable to maintain its stance of pretense 
neutrality, despite efforts to appear as a bystander. The Indonesian question reappeared on 
the front cover – but now within the context of the United Nations Organization (U.N.O.). 
The fact that the establishment of the United Nations was set in motion by the United States 
rendered a posture of aloofness problematic.  
The Soviet Union employed the forum of the United Nations Security Council 
(U.N.S.C.) to request an investigation into the Indonesian situation, charging the British 
forces with, firstly, interfering in the country’s internal affairs; denying the native population 
their right to self-determination; and as a consequence posing a threat to international 
stability. New York Times’ correspondent Reston reported on the – lack of – American 
participation in one of these U.N.O. conferences: ‘[Secretary of State] Mr. Byrnes told 
reporters that he was all for discussing the Indonesian problems before the Security Council. 
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Then he promptly flew off in President Truman’s plane … leaving Edward Stettinius Jr. [the 
U.S. delegate to the Security Council] to deal with these political hot potatoes.’44  
The correspondent sympathized with Byrnes’ limited interest in the allegations as, 
according to Reston, no one took the Soviet charges serious: ‘the true reasons for the British 
actions in Indonesia’, sounded his conclusive remark, ‘are generally understood here’.45 The 
U.N.S.C. had confidence in the ‘liberality’ of the Netherlands and the British, and ‘a 
commission of inquiry would not lead to any useful end.’46 This was precisely the stance 
taken by Stettinius, claiming that an investigation ‘might prejudice or retard negotiations’.47 
The New York Times reporter Ralph Coniston wrote a couple of articles in the same period, 
articulating that ‘to the nations of the world, the U.S. included, the Netherlands 
administration constitutes the only legal government in the Indies.’48 He reminded the 
American public that President Sukarno was ‘avowedly and undeniably’ a Japanese 
collaborator and later invoked Queen Wilhelmina’s speech as proof of the Netherlands’ 
willingness to grant the Indonesian leadership some ‘internal autonomy’. 
From late February until September 1946, articles on the Indonesian question were 
scarce. Interest flared up again in October when, after months of unrewarding negotiations, 
the discussing parties seemed to be moving towards a provisional solution. Correspondent 
Robert Trumbull delivered regular updates on these ‘peace talks’, reporting that, while the 
‘armed clashes’ continued, both the Netherlands and the Republic appeared willing to make 
concessions. The essential impediment was the influence of ‘extremists’ on either side of the 
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conflict, who impeded the establishment of an effectual agreement.49 Yet Trumbull remained 
confident that the Indonesian demand for self-determination could be reconciled with the 
Netherlands’ insistence on a transitional period of interdependence. The Dutch government 
had to yield to Republican presence in Java but it demanded, as Trumbull put it, ‘some say in 
the running of the enterprise in which they invested.’ The Netherlands was, in other words, 
prepared to ‘grant’ the Republic a measure of authority, given that the latter would safeguard 
Dutch investments in the archipelago – which the journalist believed to be a fair 
transaction. 50  As the laborious truce talks continued Trumbull noted that within the 
American public discourse the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations were referred to as a ‘comic 
opera’, as if the parleys were but a farcical intermezzo.51  
On 14 November Trumbull announced that an agreement was reached in Cirebon, 
denoting the truce optimistically as a ‘masterpiece of compromise’. The outdated practices of 
colonialism would dissolve while the continued existence of the Queen’s profitable empire 
could be secured. The Hague was willing to recognize the Republic’s hegemony in Java, 
Sumatra and Madura; and the Republican and Non-republican Islands – the latter still under 
sovereignty of the Netherlands – would together form the United States of Indonesia 
(U.S.I.). This federation would, in turn, be linked to the Netherlands Indonesian Union 
(N.I.U.). Matters of mutual interests – like foreign affairs, defense and economics – would 
be dealt with through negotiations between the U.S.I. and the N.I.U., which, as Trumbull 
stressed, secured ‘the interests of foreign business’.52 
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American media coverage in this first stage of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was, to 
briefly recapitulate, determined by two events: the first being the months of increased 
fighting; and the second concerned the negotiations within the context of the U.N. The 
Indonesian nationalists – whether it concerned the Republican leaders or the struggle groups 
– were consistently portrayed as inane imitators of the Japanese, which, according to the 
correspondents, translated primarily to violent extremism. Tokens of sincere aspirations for 
self-determination were habitually ignored. The allies – both the Netherlands and Great 
Britain – were considered as righteous players: their intention was to restore law and order, 
and to mentor the native population to eventual self-governance in the vein of the United 
States’ conduct in the Philippines. The reluctance of Washington to take a stance was 
invigorated by the popular image of the Indonesian dispute, in which the outcry of the 
nationalists, according to the American correspondents, could not be taken at face value. 
Only when the Indonesian question was taken to the (American-supported) institution of 
the United Nations and media attention consequently proliferated, the Administration felt 
coerced to issue a statement.  	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2. December 1946 – December 1948 
2.1 Historical context 
The accord reached in Cirebon in November 1946 – known as the Linggadjati agreement – 
raised hopes for the conclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict after months of armed 
confrontations and fruitless negotiations. After the treaty was ratified in March 1947, 
however, the balance of power during the transitional period was still unresolved. Historian 
Wim van den Doel sketched the situation aptly with his comment that two different 
agreements had been signed: the Indonesian leadership assented to the construction of a 
sovereign federal state in which the Republic would assume the dominant position, 
envisaging a loose collaboration with the Dutch in an essentially symbolic association. The 
Hague on the other hand anticipated the creation of a solid union that would encompass a 
wide range of political responsibilities, with the Republic being a subordinate partner.53 
Conditions for peaceful negotiation disintegrated with the departure of the British 
command. Dutch troops moved into the major cities previously guarded by the Allied forces 
and presumed sovereignty in Borneo and East Indonesia.54 Military pressure increased, and 
the Indonesian Republic was recognized de jure by Egypt and other members of the Arab 
league. These swelling tensions intensified with the financial hardships suffered by the 
Netherlands. Thus, paradoxically, when the Republic approved Linggadjati on 25 March 
1947, policymakers in The Hague conceived of intervention as imperative. In order to enable 
the continuance of their power in Java and Sumatra, the Netherlands aimed to access the 
islands’ resources and resolve the economic crisis by releasing commodities worth millions 
of guilders.55 
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The disingenuously named ‘police action’, the alleged objectives of which were to 
suppress disorder and enforce the terms of Linggadjati, commenced on 20 July 1947. Dutch 
forces spearheaded by General Spoor moved swiftly across the islands, seizing major 
economic assets while attempting to bring the Republic to its knees.56 The Netherlands, 
however, had miscalculated the approval of the international community. The events were 
brought before the U.N. Security Council, which called upon the conflicting parties to 
immediately cease hostilities. As their troops had already managed to secure most of East 
and West Java – along what became known as the ‘van Mook line’ – the Netherlands agreed 
on the cease-fire order. The truce nonetheless proved illusory and warfare along the van 
Mook line continued. 57  The Security Council then decided on the establishment and 
arbitration of a Good Offices Committee (G.O.C.) that could assist in brokering a 
settlement. The Committee consisted of Belgium, appointed by the Dutch; Australia, 
nominated by the Indonesian Republic; and the United States, agreed upon by the Belgian 
and Australian envoys.  
The wide gulf of mistrust between the Netherlands and the Republic remained. The 
American representative to the G.O.C. Frank Graham, who feared another Dutch offensive, 
held the conviction that the two sides had to be coerced into a settlement. Graham’s idea 
materialized with the ratification of the – according to Reid – synthetic Renville agreement in 
January 1948. The treaty, drawn up by the U.S., openly favored the Netherlands. It 
legitimated the van Mook line, while the Indonesian premier Sjarifuddin received nothing 
more than the false assurance of plebiscites in the annexed regions.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibidem, 112. 
57 Ibidem, 113-114. 
58 Ibidem, 114. 
 25 
 The ‘police action’ had put a major economic strain on the Indonesian Republic, 
playing into a surge of political polarization. The Soviet-backed communist opposition, 
being extremely critical of the Republic’s approval of the Renville agreement, reverted to the 
hard line of ‘one hundred percent freedom’. By March 1948 the left wing of the Republic’s 
political spectrum was united under the People’s Democratic Front, who advocated for the 
nationalization of the economy and close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sukarno and 
Hatta, reclaiming the Republican leadership after the resignation of Sjarifuddin’s government 
in January 1948, objected to an alignment with the Kremlin.59 
 August 1948 marked the re-arrival of Musso, a veteran leader of an abortive 1926 
communist uprising in Indonesia. Musso unified the opposition under the banner of the  
Indonesian Communist Party, and insisted on an alliance with the Soviet bloc.60  The 
following month, communist cadres captured installations in Madiun, killing pro-Republican 
officers and proclaiming a People’s Front Government. Sukarno responded fiercely by 
declaring war on the rebels. He denounced the events in Madiun as ‘sinister plans’ to replace 
the Republic by a Soviet-led government. The suppression of the rebellion, accomplished by 
the end of September, proved an immense success for the Republican leadership. Sukarno 
and Hatta’s fierce opposition to communism, in combination with their prompt and decisive 
counteractions, had greatly strengthened their standing in the face of the international 
community. 61 
 Meanwhile the Netherlands attempted to further extend the United States of 
Indonesia by erecting puppet governments in a number of federal states. Dutch Prime 
Minister van Beel announced that he wanted to erase the Republic from ‘the political and 
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mental map of Indonesia’, and claimed that action would be required – launching a second 
‘police action’ on 18 December 1948.62 
 
2.2 American views 
In April 1947 the U.S. State Department made the symbolic gesture of extending de facto 
recognition to the Indonesian Republic, yet the tacit acceptance of the Netherlands’ 
sovereignty in the East Indies remained unchallenged. The Truman administration’s top 
priority was to stabilize the archipelago’s economy and considered Dutch authority as crucial 
to this end. When negotiations stalled on the issue of the allocation of power during the 
transitional period, the State Department intervened on behalf of the Netherlands. The 
American government sent an aide-memoire to the Republic to resume peace talks on the basis 
of the Dutch interpretation of Linggadjati, coaxing Sjahrir to accept de jure sovereignty of the 
Netherlands in June 1947.63 
The first ‘police action’ hardly stirred the State Department’s attitude towards the 
Netherlands’ legitimacy in Indonesia. The Truman administration had vowed to commit 
itself to the defense of Europe and regarded the Netherlands as one of the continent’s most 
stable elements. The reinstatement of the economic ties between the metropole and the East 
Indies was seen as an essential stage in the protection and strengthening of the Netherlands, 
and with it the European community.64 
The State Department – desperate to cultivate its own schemes and avoid Soviet 
entanglement – endeavored to prevent the Security Council from interfering in the 
archipelago. The U.S. government complied with The Hague’s assertion that the situation in 
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Indonesia was an ‘internal affair’, which would obstruct U.N. intervention. However, as 
condemnatory voices swelled, the Administration felt constrained to present a resolution 
that would underline U.S. approval of the Council’s involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian 
affair while securing a hand in its advancements. The subsequent establishment of the Good 
Offices Committee provided for the American objectives. The Committee’s impact would 
be restricted by its advisory role; the United States, holding a seat in the committee, was able 
to direct developments; and the Kremlin was effectively sidelined.65 
The January 1948 Renville agreement, displaying plain favoritism towards the 
Netherlands by sanctioning their military gains, affirmed the State Department’s policy of 
reinforcing European dominion while simultaneously attempting to preserve, as Roadnight 
stated ‘the fiction of U.S. non-involvement by stressing the part played by the G.O.C. … in 
the negotiations’.66 Even when The Hague, within days of the treaty’s validation, planned to 
install a Federal Interim Government detrimental to the Renville agreement, the State 
Department remained reticent. 67  The Australian representative to the Security Council 
remarked that America’s inclination to release Indonesia’s resources onto the world market 
took precedence over consolidating Indonesian independence.68  
When the developing world was drawn into the Cold War competition, U.S. foreign 
policy became less absorbed with Europe. Southeast Asia, and Indonesia in particular, 
attracted the State Department’s interest for primarily strategic reasons. The head of the 
Department’s policy planning staff George Kennan noted that the archipelago was ‘the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Gouda and Zaalberg, American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, 172-173. 
66 Roadnight, United States foreign policy towards Indonesia, 40. 
67 McMahon, Colonialism and cold war, 211-212. 
68 Roadnight, United States foreign policy towards Indonesia, 41. 
 28 
crucial issue of the moment in our struggle with the Kremlin’, and that ‘we should develop 
[Indonesia] as a politico-economic counterforce to communism in the Asian landmass’.69 
At the same time the U.S. government began to realize that its trust in The Hague’s 
sincerity with regard to promoting America’s best interests in Indonesia was misplaced. U.S. 
intelligence in the region in addition to the State Department’s representative to the G.O.C 
both had to contend that the Netherlands could not be relied upon when it came to securing 
a compromise with the Indonesian Republic; without a settlement, economic rehabilitation 
would certainly prove impossible.70  
While faith in Dutch reliability was crumbling, the Administration’s confidence in the 
Indonesian leadership grew. The Republic had, with the suppression of the Madiun 
rebellion, positioned itself squarely in the anti-communist camp, while its leaders proved 
capable of providing the basis of a firm government. The State Department thus agreed that 
this time around pressure had to be applied to the Netherlands. On 7 December 1948 an 
aide-memoire reached the Foreign Ministry in The Hague, which presented the framework for 
a political settlement and identified the subsistence of the Republic as essential. The 
document noted that renewed military action would exhaust the Dutch resources and might 
obstruct the continuance of Marshall Plan aid.71  
Media interest in the Dutch-Indonesian problem intensified substantially between 
December 1946 and December 1948. New York Times’ items averaged forty-six articles a 
month – an increase of over fifty percent when compared with the period between August 
1945 and November 1946. Publicity during these two years was, in addition, to a greater 
extent centered on a couple of major events. In July and August 1947 attention proliferated, 
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with respectively 179 and 202 New York Times items on the Indonesian issue. Interest flared 
up again in December 1948, when the newspaper devoted 159 articles to the conflict. The 
twenty-two remaining months within this timespan had a record of between fourteen and 
seventy monthly items on the Indonesian question. Strikingly however, the number of cover 
articles decreased both relatively and absolutely: a mere fifty-eight reports appeared on the 
first page over the course of these twenty-five months, with twelve items in July 1947; 
thirteen items in the subsequent month; and eighteen front-page articles in December 1948. 
Washington Post reportage on the Indonesian question remained slight when 
juxtaposed with the New York Times. Nonetheless, the average amount increased from ten to 
fourteen Washington Post articles on the conflict each month – a surge comparable to the 
relative growth of reportage in the New York Times. Moreover, moments of heightened 
attention ran parallel to the other daily’s peaks in news coverage. July 1947 counted forty-
one items on the Indonesian topic; in the month that followed articles totaled sixty-eight; 
and in December 1948 the sum of articles on the conflict equaled fifty-six, versus an average 
of eight items during the other months of this approximately two-year-period. Especially 
with respect to the amount of front-page articles in the New York Times, Washington Post cover 
attention to the question was high. The phase between December 1946 and December 1948 
comprised sixty-six front-page items, with thirteen in July 1947; sixteen in August 1947; and 
fifteen in December 1948.  
Neither the New York Times nor the Washington Post had a correspondent positioned 
in the Indonesian archipelago over the span of these two years. Both newspapers relied for 
their information from the Indies on United Press and Associated Press reportage. These 
news agencies, in turn, depended to a large extent on Dutch and Indonesian communiqués, 
since the Dutch-Indonesian front lines were effectively cordoned off for press agents. The 
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lack of eyewitnesses’ accounts resulted in an at times ludicrous news output: correspondents 
had often little choice but to reiterate the sharply contrasting statements of the antagonizing 
parties. 
Front-page coverage of the Indonesian issue started when the Dutch embarked on 
the first ‘police action’. The military operation caused a noticeable shift in the newspapers’ 
tone. Articles appearing in the first three weeks of July – before the beginning of the Dutch 
military campaign – conveyed a hesitant optimism, as a compromise was still held feasible 
and belief in Dutch righteousness stood strong.72 A Washington Post item of 2 July designated 
the policy adopted by the Netherlands as ‘liberal and farsighted’, whereas the Republican 
‘extremists’, who were under the spell of Sukarno –whose ‘chief claim to fame’, according to 
the author Sumner Welles, was that he had ‘accepted a high Japanese decoration’ – 
obstructed the restoration of commercial activity. The chaos in Java, moreover, would 
provide fertile soil for ‘Moscow’s agents’: and therefore Dutch guidance was deemed not 
only beneficial but also imperative.73 
The first items on the military operation, appearing from 20 July onwards, were still 
inclined towards the Netherlands’ perspective. Official statements issued by the Dutch 
Governor General van Mook dominated the news agencies’ accounts. Van Mook claimed 
that the limited ‘police actions’ were The Hague’s last resort, since the Republic continued to 
violate the terms of the Linggadjati agreement. General Spoor, playing to the United States’ 
commercial interests, asserted that the Netherlands was not waging a war but that the 
operation was required for economic rehabilitation; the Republic’s ‘scorched earth tactics’ 
allegedly endangered the foreign industrial plants and infrastructure in Indonesia.74 The 
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Dutch troops had the ‘responsibilities’ of stabilizing the explosive situation and guaranteeing 
the restoration of law and order. Van Mook and the Dutch ambassador to the United States 
van Kleffens repeatedly emphasized that the operating forces encountered little opposition, 
as the majority of the native population welcomed the Dutch soldiers with enthusiasm.75 
Numerous accounts added that the Dutch elite military unit in situ had enjoyed training by 
and received military equipment from the U.S. marines at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina – 
as if to say that America emphatically supported intervention.76  
Reporters, however, became increasingly wary of censorship. They noted that their 
correspondence was subject to meticulous scrutiny and that all available information was 
channeled through communiqués.77 If initially the ‘so-called Republic’ was placed between 
inverted commas, now the ‘police action’ was submitted to this treatment of skepticism.78 
The correspondents underlined the grave dissonances between Dutch and Republican 
intelligence. As the Netherlands voiced its rhetoric of limited-scope actions and ‘no 
resistance worth mentioning’, Indonesian intelligence referred to a full-scale colonial war and 
stiffening opposition. When Spoor reported, on 27 July, that Dutch victims amounted to 
thirty-two killed, fifty wounded and seven missing, General Sudirman affirmed that the 
opposing army suffered at least 9000 casualties.79 
When the boundary between truth and fiction faded American criticism rose. The 
media expressed the United States’ regret regarding The Hague’s unilateral decision to resort 
to military intervention before all peaceful means had been exhausted. Correspondents 
began to question the employment of U.S. armaments in Indonesia, which, in combination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ‘First phase of the military action over’, WP, 26 July 1947. 
76 F. Kuhn, ‘Rich resources threatened by ‘scorched earth’ policy’, WP, 22 July 1947. 
77 ‘Netherlands wages full colonial war’, WP, 22 July 1947. 
78 ‘The war in Indonesia’, NYT, 24 July 1947. 
79 S.S. Swinton, ‘Indonesians’ main force in pincers’, WP, 27 July 1947. 
 32 
with critical voices in Congress, may have pressured the State Department to announce that 
the United States had not ‘furnished any war material’ since V-J Day.80 The New York Times 
quoted the Indian president Nehru, who fiercely criticized Dutch intervention and, as The 
Hague had attempted before, appealed to the economic interests of the United States while 
arguing for Indonesian independence. Nehru contended that the continuation of Dutch 
aggressions would not only endanger peace but would also stand in the way of worldwide 
economic recovery.81 The Washington Post of 20 July printed a passionate speech by the 
Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Gani, in which he proclaimed that ‘it is unthinkable that 
the world should allow a nation like the Dutch, who themselves were oppressed by Hitler’s 
Germany, to use force’. Gani continued with an appeal to ‘the common sense of the Dutch 
people and of the world, which we know believes in the Atlantic Charter.’82 Sukarno, in a 
New York Times article of 25 July, similarly petitioned to the ‘fundamental ideals’ of the 
United States. He made the comparison that ‘just as your American ancestors fought 170 
years ago for your liberty and independence, so are we Indonesians fighting for ours’ and he 
delivered a plea to ‘President Truman and … the people of the United States to stand by the 
principles of justice and right for which you fought so valiantly only two years ago.’83 Thus, 
interestingly, both the Netherlands’ and Republican spokesmen were clearly trying to win the 
favor from the American press – apparently deeply concerned about what the public would 
read and think, and what political action this could provoke. 
In addition to the anticipated deterioration of the economic situation in the Indies; 
the wariness with regard to Dutch rhetoric; and the international appeals to the American 
principles of freedom and democracy, reporters commented on the dangers the operations 	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posed in the face of the expanding Soviet power. The ‘police actions’ would certainly be 
exploited by U.S.S.R. propaganda to the discredit of the entire western world. It was 
essentially for this reason that the media called on the State Department to bring the 
Indonesian affair before the U.N. Security Council, for if another country failed to do so, 
‘Soviet Russia may do it in her favorite … role as a friend of “oppressed” colonial peoples.’84 
The New York Times asserted that the situation called for ‘bold and decisive action, preferably 
by the U.N’, as the time had long past that the two parties could reach a peaceful solution 
among each other.85 Thus whereas the State Department was still reluctant to attend to the 
recourse of the Security Council, the press already marshaled the U.S. government in that 
direction.  
Although the Dutch role in the Indonesian affair started to attract some disparaging 
opinions, the first military operation did not completely turn the tables on the Netherlands. 
London-stationed New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews pinpointed the 
quintessential American attitude by declaring that ‘the feeling is that there is much of right 
and wrong on both sides and that the Dutch have been very patient on the whole’. Matthews 
further contended that in U.S. government circles, no disposition existed that depicted ‘the 
Indonesians as pure white and the Dutch as pure black.’86 A Washington Post account by the 
journalist Barnet Nover contained a similar import: The Netherlands had indeed antagonized 
world opinion by succumbing to the temptation of using military force in order to achieve 
political ends, but the right was never on one side. It was, according to the author, in the 
interest of the world population that fighting ceased as promptly as possible, since the 
products of this ‘fabulously rich area’ were needed by everyone. With this purpose in mind 
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the ‘enlightened plan of an Indonesian federation’ should be implemented – signaling that, in 
spite of the Dutch blunder, the correspondents were still convinced that the Netherlands’ 
presence in the archipelago would fulfill U.S. objectives.87 
In August 1947, American press coverage was dominated by the question whether 
the U.N. Security Council had to be clothed with the task of mediating the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict. Australia, India and Russia called for U.N. intervention, but van 
Kleffens was perseverant in his claim that the council had no legitimacy to interfere in 
domestic affairs. The New York Times correspondent Thomas Hamilton reported from the 
U.N. congregation at Lake Success that the United States was susceptible to van Kleffens 
argument, who had contended that the council had no more right to become involved in the 
Netherlands’ ‘police action’ than in ‘a dispute between the U.S. government and one of the 
forty-eight states.’88 The U.S. representative to the Security Council Johnson had, in addition, 
been ‘disturbed’ by the ramification of the Australian appeal to the U.N., which stipulated 
the conflict as a breach to international peace. Hamilton thus concluded that the State 
Department’s position vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was shifting. Whereas the 
United States had viewed the Dutch military action with ‘obvious disapproval’, the U.S. 
representative ‘referred today to the “so-called” republic, and opposed the [Australian] 
demand…that an Indonesian representative receive the right to state his case in the council 
on the same footing as the Netherlands’ representative.’89 This ambiguous government 
stance was again underlined in a New York Times item of 2 August 1947. The Netherlands, 
the article conveyed, had set itself in the wrong by resorting to military action, yet there was 
ample reason to question ‘the power of the Indonesian government to enforce its decisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87B. Nover, ‘Strife in Java’, WP, 26 July 1947. 
88 T.J. Hamilton, ‘US plan approved’, NYT, 1 August 1947. 
89 Idem. 
 35 
against the hotheads in the camp.’90 Three weeks later the newspaper paraphrased Johnson, 
commenting on ‘the incompetence and inability of the Indonesian government’, and the 
Indonesian people’s need for proper police protection.91 The Dutch military operation might 
have been an unnecessary muscle-flexing move but Republican inaptitude and inferiority 
were still widely perceived as axiomatic. With this line of thought, the United States 
implicitly consented to continued Dutch authority.  
U.S.-Indonesian relations further cooled when Sjahrir refused to accept the 
American offer of good offices. ‘How’, voiced Sjahrir rhetorically ‘can there be free 
negotiations when one party stands with a pistol pointed at the head of the other?’92 The 
U.S. emissary Johnson was accused of circumventing the Security Council’s authority, in 
order to settle the conflict on terms advantageous to the United States and the colonial 
powers. The Netherlands, France, the U.K. and the U.S. were eager to prevent the council 
from creating a commission for the arbitration of Dutch-Indonesian differences, as the 
establishment of such a body ‘might set a precedent for similar U.N. action in other colonial 
disputes’.93 
Frictions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union continued. The Soviet 
representative to the Security Council Gromyko charged the Netherlands with behaving ‘as 
if this organization did not exist at all’ and attacked the United States on the grounds that it 
attempted to ‘force’ its good offices on the Indonesian Republic. Johnson, in turn, replied 
that the Soviet representative was probing to ‘use the council as a propaganda forum in the 
usual Soviet method.’94 Washington and Moscow used the pretext of the Indonesian dispute 
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to ameliorate their respective positions in the international community. They fought their 
Cold War through the institution of the Security Council. 
Johnson’s favorable disposition towards the Netherlands harvested the approval of 
some, but evoked incomprehension in others. A Washington Post item written by Marquis 
Childs denounced the ‘stubbornness of the Dutch’, and their ‘white imperialism’. The author 
warned that the military invasion had been a ‘handsome gift to the communists’, who could 
‘make full use of it in their drive to annex Asia’s millions.’ Beyond the resulting chaos, ‘the 
jackal of totalitarian communism’ was waiting to take over. Childs ended on the note that, 
although the U.S. had won the world war, it had not yet won world peace.95 New York Times 
correspondent Foster Hailey supported Child’s assumptions. He stated that ‘anti-white’ 
sentiments in Asia had been fuelled due to the Netherlands’ ‘small and grudging’ 
concessions. Hailey presented the manner in which the United States had ‘guided’ and 
‘burgeoned’ the nationalist movement in the Philippines as the most liberal and appropriate 
conduct of affairs with respect to imperial possessions.96  
Meanwhile, both newspapers provided the stage for an impassionate discussion that 
transpired in a series of ‘letters to the editor’ between a pro-Netherlands camp and its anti-
Dutch opposition. The former argued that the European power brought economic, 
scientific, educational, and moral progress to the Indonesian native population, while the 
latter feared the loss of American prestige in Asia. The press once again constituted the 
mouthpiece for stimulating the U.S. government to report to the U.N. New York Times reader 
Ernest Power wrote on 21 August 1947: ‘If a man is murdering his wife in his own house the 
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police have no right to interfere, says Holland with reference to Indonesia. Does the Security 
Council agree? If not, urgent measures should be taken.’97  
After more than a year of relative quiet, the Indonesian question surfaced again in 
December 1948 when the Netherlands launched the second ‘police action’. With this 
violation of the American-mediated Renville agreement, the U.S. State Department was 
quick to denounce the Dutch move. Washington held the belief that the ‘surest way’ to 
stimulate communism would be through military intervention, and that the U.S.S.R. would 
gratefully exploit the action to ‘occupy a new propaganda beachhead’ in the region.98 In 
addition to the conviction that the Netherlands’ intervention would foment communism 
rather than avert it, the State Department as well as the media expressed concern over the 
fact that the Dutch had taken measures in spite of the U.S.-mediated Renville agreement and 
the Security Council’s mediation. The broken promise would deal a hard blow to the 
‘western prestige in the east’ and the authority of the United Nations.99 
The media were struck by the Administration’s sudden ‘tough attitude’.100 While the 
Dutch ambassador van Kleffens persisted in his rhetoric of the threat of communists 
permeating the Republic, the U.S. delegate to the Security Council did not hesitate to identify 
the Netherlands as culprit. Many articles, however, still depicted U.S. intervention as too 
timid. The Washington Post reporter Child claimed, on 21 December 1948, that the American 
stance lacked ‘constructive and positive purpose’. The New York Times accused the State 
Department of intervening ‘eighteen months too late’.101  
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The United States suspended the economic aid earmarked for the recovery of the 
Dutch East Indies as a token of its disapproval. However, funds to the Netherlands 
continued. The rationale was that if the Dutch were eliminated as a recipient of recovery 
grants the ‘surrounding Marshall Plan structure would be shaken as by an earthquake, and 
with it our security policy.’102 The Netherlands constituted a keystone of the economic and 
military security systems in Europe that were vital to the United States and, according to the 
New York Times journalist Sulzberger, ‘it would appear fairly certain at this stage of post-war 
history that the U.S. remains determined to restore Western Europe to a healthy condition 
regardless of what tragedies loom in Asia.’ 103  In addition, both New York Times and 
Washington Post correspondents continued to emphasize the ‘stout ties of blood’ and the 
political sentiments that united the two trans-Atlantic countries.104 
Thus, the second phase of the Dutch-Indonesian question initiated a number of 
remarkable trends in the American reportage. Firstly, the media reflected the endeavors of 
both Dutch and Indonesian communiqués to frame their respective positions and aims 
within (anticipated) United States’ interests. The spokesmen of either party expected that if 
they could persuade the American public of the advantages of their schemes the State 
Department would follow suit.  
The Netherlands’ government, moreover, lost some of their moral high ground as 
the press scathed The Hague for embarking on another ‘police action’ in defiance of the 
U.S.-mediated Renville resolution. Criticism was essentially pragmatic rather than idealist. 
The Netherlands’ move, the media presumed, would affect American prestige; play into the 
hands of the communist expansion; and would additionally endanger plans for (European) 	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economic recovery. The Dutch were still perceived as a good-natured ally but they had to 
ensure not to harm U.S. foreign policy schemes. The media’s pragmatic view equally 
manifested itself in its representation of the Indonesian Republic. The Republican 
government was no longer regarded as utterly unqualified, but the Indonesian desire to exist 
independently from the Netherlands – which was considered beyond American interests – 
found very little resonance. Indonesian inferiority, moreover, remained a conspicuous 
theme, expressed in the allusions to the Netherlands’ mission of ‘educating the native 
population’ – in the manner with which the United States had cultivated the Philippines. 
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3. January – December 1949 
3.1 Historical context 
The second military aggression resulted in, as Reid described it, an ‘unmitigated disaster’ for 
the Netherlands.105 The Hague had gambled on the strategy of convincing the Security 
Council that the Indonesian Republic could not be considered a significant partner for 
negotiations. Circumstances proved rather the reverse. 
In spite of their imprisonment by the Dutch, the Republican leaders had refused to 
budge on their beliefs. Their uncompromising mentality endowed them with an aura of 
martyrdom and gave great impetus to their popularity. The guerrilla movement, in addition, 
gained momentum and received wide support from the Indonesian population who 
displayed an increasing solidarity with the freedom struggle. And, lastly, the resignation of 
various administrations and leaders in Dutch-supported federal governments	   – realizing, 
with the launch of the second ‘police action’, that The Hague intended to annihilate the 
Republic whose government the federalist leadership had regarded as a counterbalance to 
the Dutch sphere of influence – constituted the final blow to the Netherlands’ stature.106  
The Hague, well aware that its position vis-à-vis the Republic and its reputation 
within the international community were disintegrating, presented the Security Council with 
the progressive-sounding ‘van Beel plan’. The plan furnished the council with a blueprint for 
the forthcoming Round Table Conference, which would constitute the platform for 
negotiations on a prompt transfer of power. However, this Dutch grand scheme amounted 
to yet another attempt to avert the de jure sovereignty of the Republic. The Security Council, 
refusing to compromise on the issue of restoring the Republican government, rebuffed The 
Hague’s proposal.  	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The economic, military and diplomatic predicament of the Netherlands rendered its 
unyielding attitude impossible. Negotiations resumed at the Batavia Conference in April 
1949 and the resulting Roem-van Roijen agreement, ratified on 7 May 1949, effected the 
restoration of the Republican leadership to their quarters in Jogjakarta. The subsequent 
Round Table Conference, set it motion in late August, ended the conflict’s intermittent 
impasse. On 27 December The Hague transferred unconditional sovereignty over the former 
Netherlands East Indies to the Federal Indonesian Republic. The new Federal Republic’s 
constitution delineated two-third of its legislative seats to federal representatives but ‘no 
federal politicians could compare in stature with Sukarno and Hatta’.107 
 
3.2 American views 
The Hague’s recourse to military action in December 1948 formed a turning point in U.S. 
policy regarding the Indonesian dispute. The Hague had angered the State Department by 
pursuing its own agenda despite the American-mediated Renville agreement. This 
inconsiderate move had, according to the Truman Administration, not only impaired the 
prestige of the United Nations and the Unites States, but also jeopardized U.S. foreign policy 
objectives.108  
As condemnatory voices rose – both domestically and in the international arena – 
the Administration decided to suspend Marshall Plan aid apportioned to the recovery of the 
Netherlands East Indies.  This ‘tough line’, however, was little more than a façade. Under 
Secretary of State Robert Lovett told the British Ambassador Franks that the Economic 
Cooperation Administration’s (E.C.A.) suspension of financial assistance was an attempt to 
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divert demands in congress calling for a halt of funding to the Netherlands itself, and 
‘canalize the rising tide of popular indignation’.109 
Thus the shift in the State Department’s approach did not mark a sudden conversion 
to an idealistic support for the nationalist movement; rather, it was the result of a persistently 
pragmatic outlook. The director of the office of United Nations Affairs Dean Rusk 
contended that at the end of the day, Washington was ‘pursuing [its] own interests and 
policies.’110 
At this point in time the Truman Administration’s primary concern was the 
containment of communism, especially since a communist victory in China was looming. 
The State Department became convinced that the restoration of the moderate Republican 
leadership was imperative in maintaining stability and preventing the further spread of 
communist ideology in Southeast Asia. Washington concluded that its long-term economic 
and diplomatic objectives would best be served by promoting political independence.111 
Whereas hitherto the State Department had succeeded in restricting the influence of 
the Security Council to a mere advisory function, henceforth the U.S. government intended 
to employ the Council for assertive intervention. Thus, at the dawn of 1949 the U.S. 
delegation to the United Nations marked its departure from their government’s passive 
attitude by circulating a draft resolution to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, while sharply 
criticizing the Netherlands’ intransigence over the reestablishment of the Republic. 112  
Washington’s viewpoint was invigorated by the fact that the Netherlands-backed federal 
cabinets handed in their resignation, ‘uniting’ as Roadnight asserted ‘all shades of Indonesian 
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opinion behind the UN resolutions and making it easier for the Truman Administration to 
insist on Dutch compliance.’113 
On 23 March 1949 the U.N. Security Council passed a motion formulating a 
preliminary conference in Batavia, on which occasion the arrangements of the Round Table 
Conference and the release of the Jogjakarta government would be negotiated. If The Hague 
failed to comply with these measures, the U.S. was prepared to withhold the Netherlands’ 
membership to the prospective North Atlantic alliance. The Batavia Conference and the 
ensuing Roem-van Roijen agreement – mediated by the American emissary Merle Cochran – 
demonstrated that Washington’s stringent attitude was urging the Netherlands towards a 
final settlement.  
Three issues dominated the Round Table Conference, opening on 23 August 1949. 
The Indonesian leadership was worried that the Netherlands-Indonesian Union would 
curtail the Republic’s sovereignty, yet the two most acute areas of disagreement concerned 
the amount of debt Indonesia would assume from the Netherlands East Indies and the 
future of West New Guinea – an area the Netherlands wanted to retain, chiefly as a matter 
of prestige. Cochran, intent on installing a moderate nationalist leadership and ipso facto 
isolate the threat of communism, presented a solution that left the Republic’s sovereignty 
unhampered by interference from The Hague. However, the settlements to the remaining 
matters reflected the sympathy the State Department still felt towards their European ally.114 
The U.S. representative persuaded Indonesia to accept the lion’s share of the Netherlands 
East Indies’ debt, and they equally had to acquiesce in the postponement of a resolution 
concerning the future of New Guinea. Having agreed on these questions, the conference 
closed on 2 November 1949 and the transfer of power to the Republic of the United States 	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of Indonesia, supervised by the U.S., ensued on 27 December 1949. The State Department 
overtly identified the birth of an independent Indonesia as its personal diplomatic success.115 
The last phase of the dispute saw again a significant increase in media interest. The 
New York Times published a total of 758 items on the conflict in 1949, averaging sixty-three 
articles per month or over two articles a day. This constituted almost a fifty percent rise in 
attention again in comparison with the previous period. News coverage on the Indonesian 
affair reached its zenith in January 1949 with a record of 173 news items – averaging almost 
six daily articles referring to the Indonesian question. The mean number of articles in the 
remaining eleven months floated between forty-one and seventy-four items. Front-page 
articles added up to forty-seven items over the span of the entire year and displayed a similar 
curve in the level of attention as the complete number of articles, with a heightened interest 
of fifteen cover stories in January which amounted to almost a third of all front-page items 
on Indonesian published over the course of 1949. A second apex of attention occurred in 
December, when nine accounts concerning the events appeared on the first page. 
Washington Post coverage on the conflict in this last stage of the Dutch-Indonesian 
affair nearly doubled with respect to the previous two years. The average number of items 
rose from fourteen to a little over twenty-three articles each month, the sum being 279 
articles in 1949. Attention peaked – analogous to the New York Times – in January, with a 
total of 59 articles. During the rest of this period interest amounted to between eleven and 
thirty-one items a month. Front-page stories remained stable with respect to the first years 
of the conflict, the monthly average always fluctuating between two and three front-cover 
items. The pinnacles of page-one attention diverted slightly from those of the New York 
Times, with heightened interest not only in January and December but also in April 1949, at a 	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time that U.S. government debates on the matter of the continuance or discontinuance of 
Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies were in full swing. 
The New York Times sent two reporters to the East Indies during 1949. 
Correspondent Robert Trumbull, who had visited the archipelago before, provided regular 
updates on the Indonesian dispute in the early months of 1949. Later on, in the summer of 
the same year, the Times journalist Bertram Hulen accompanied a press journey organized by 
the government in the Netherlands – an operation designed to ‘illuminate’ the American 
public on the situation in the Indies. Aside from news originating in the Southeast Asian 
region, for the American public much of the body of articles concerning the Dutch-
Indonesian affair sprang from the debates in the U.N. Security Council in New York, the 
political meanderings in Washington and the communiqués deriving from the Dutch 
political capital where the New York Times correspondent David Anderson was situated. 
The Washington Post continued to rely on the larger press syndicates for their 
reportage on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Not just news deriving from the Indonesian 
archipelago, but also coverage of the debates transpiring in The Hague and the U.N. were 
predominantly based on accounts from United Press and Associated Press sources. This 
dependence on external agents engendered a fairly flat and uniform news output, which 
often built on the articulations of government officials, yet was devoid of any extra layers of 
analysis or reflection. Only the Post reporter Ferdinand Kuhn, who was stationed in 
Washington, published a small number of articles that referred to the U.S. government’s 
musings on the Indonesian dispute. Kuhn turned out to be the perfect messenger of the 
State Department’s rhetoric presented to the outside world. Washington Post columnist Drew 
Pearson, however, offered with his polemical pieces some depth to the debates, as did the 
constant supply of impassioned ‘Letters to the editor’. 
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The January reportage of the New York Times was dominated by disparaging remarks 
on the ineffectiveness of both the U.N. Security Council and the U.S. government with 
regard to the impasse in the peace talks and the Dutch violation of the cease-fire order. The 
reporters stressed the view shared by Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
that the Security Council could not possibly condone the Netherlands’ use of force and that 
the U.N.’s failure to solve the Indonesian question would be disastrous to the potency of the 
Security Council.116 The Philippines – humiliatingly, as the Truman Administration lauded its 
fair conduct and friendly relations with the former colonial area – accused the United States 
of ‘compounding twice over the unhappy blunder of the U.S.S.R.’ in its failure to call in 
earnest for troop withdrawals.117 
The denigrating comments on the United Nations’ and the State Department’s 
inaction had little ground in idealism. The Dutch ‘police actions’ and the subsequent inability 
or unwillingness of the world powers to react adequately and bring forth a durable 
settlement was feared to damage the stability of all colonial areas in Asia and add to the 
immediate strengthening of the international communist line. The situation, Trumbull 
commented, had handed the communists two ‘made-to-order’ weapons: the first was anti-
imperialist propaganda, primarily directed at the United States and Great Britain; and the 
second constituted the creation of new tensions in Southeast Asia and the accentuation of 
old ones, like the contrast between ‘ruled versus ruler, non-whites versus whites, and coolie 
workers versus well-fed employers’ – disparities which in the same manner could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 ‘Dutch report end of fighting in Java’, NYT, 1 January 1949; ‘Burma to dispatch Indies expedition’, NYT, 3 
January 1949; G. Barrett, ‘U.N.’s Indies body suggests it quit’, NYT, 8 January 1949. 
117 G. Barrett, ‘U.N.’s Indies body suggests it quit’, NYT, 8 January 1949. 
 47 
exploited by the communists to garner converts. 118  Thus Trumbull, as did other 
correspondents, expected a heightened possibility of ‘leftist consolidation’ in Indonesia.119  
And New York Times reporters foresaw a second repercussion: Dutch aggression in 
the Indies and the subsequent Western powers’ inertia would increasingly drive a wedge 
between Asia on the one hand and Europe and the United States on the other. The majority 
of the Asian continent perceived the Netherlands’ action as a veil for the restoration of 
colonialism and intended to make a collaborative fist.120 The Asian conference of 20 January 
would, in the eyes of the journalists, plant the seeds for ‘powerful regional growth’ – to the 
detriment of diplomatic and economic American interests.121 The ‘hungry world markets’ 
were longing for Asia’s raw materials and, as New York Times correspondent Trumbull wrote, 
the ‘general world prosperity’ would be disturbed by the hurt relations between Asia and the 
West.122 
The newspaper accounts provided the impetus for a solution to the continuing 
deadlock. The formation of an Asian bloc and the reinforcement of communism, the press 
agents concluded, could only be halted through the ‘concerted efforts of the United Nations 
and the United States’.123 Mid-January the State Department proposed that the Security 
Council authorize a new commission to determine the areas that could gradually be returned 
to the Republican administration and presented a working paper concerning the Federal 
Interim Government, general elections for the native population and the release of the 
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Republican leadership.124 At the end of the month the Security Council, with the active 
support of the United States, ratified a resolution that put an end to the impasse; and not 
long after, the Administration decided to suspend financial aid originally allocated to the 
Netherlands East Indies. Although these constructive measures cannot be ascribed to the 
merits of the popular press alone, the media – considered to also represent public opinion – 
must have played their due part. 
The communiqués issued by Dutch officials since the commencement of the conflict 
in 1945, and designed for primarily American consumption, decreased in effectiveness since 
the G.O.C. had discovered a couple of grave incongruences between issued statements and 
observed conditions in the archipelago.125 Foreign minister Stikker, however, still claimed in 
the 23 January New York Times to ‘foresee only chaos if the resolution is allowed to stand as 
it is now.’ 126  Thus, in June 1949 the New York Times correspondent Bertram Hulen, 
accompanied by a congregation of a dozen American journalists, arrived in the Indonesian 
archipelago as a guest of the Netherlands government. The Hague’s last resort to regain the 
United States’ goodwill amounted to an orchestrated press journey with the aspiration of 
rendering American public opinion – and consequently U.S. government – favorable to the 
Netherlands’ conduct in the Indies.127 The United States’ consent was, evidently, a prime 
consideration for the policy-makers in The Hague.   
The effort of the junket’s coordinators to convey the indispensability of Dutch 
leverage in Indonesia and, accordingly, convince the State Department to resume Marshall 
Plan aid soon appeared to bear fruit. Correspondent Hulen, receptive to his host’s 	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arguments, obediently echoed Dutch rhetoric in his New York Times contributions. The 
reporter defined communism as the ‘hard core of resistance’ to order in the archipelago, and 
quoted van Roijen – clearly appealing to the allegedly American ideal of self-determination – 
when he contended that the cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia would 
inspire a ‘positive program of democratic government’.128  
The Hague’s representatives to the excursion had, in addition, presented the 
Netherlands’ blueprint for an open-door policy concerning commercial relations in 
Indonesia, ‘citing’ as Hulen wrote, ‘American rubber, oil, and other interests’. 129  The 
rendition of these plans led the correspondent to comment that the ‘area could become 
strategically of great importance to the United States.’130 Thus, Dutch government officials 
were well aware that U.S. support required not only a plea to American-specific principles, 
but that assistance from the State Department would stand or fall with its perception of the 
profitability of Dutch presence in the archipelago towards the U.S. government’s interests. 
Although the company of American reporters proved fairly susceptible to the Netherlands’ 
reasoning, the impact of their favorable disposition was hampered by a tragic turn of fate. 
The airplane carrying the party of journalists crashed near Bombay  – killing all passengers, 
and leaving most of their stories unpublished.131 
Contrasted with the New York Times, the Washington Post coverage of the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict was quite unequivocal. Reportage was determined by matter-of-fact 
observations of the proceedings within the confines of the Security Council and the U.S. 
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State Department, and, as stated earlier, stemmed chiefly from external press agencies’ 
accounts. There were a couple of deviations from the norm. 
The Post reporter Ferdinand Kuhn, writing from and on Washington, became the 
mouthpiece of American foreign policy during the last months of the dispute. Kuhn’s 
accounts reinforced the conception that the United States assumed an essentially realist 
outlook in its conduct of the Indonesian affair. Towards the end of the conflict, on 2 
November 1949, Kuhn wrote that ‘American policy-makers are convinced that the real 
alternative to communism in Asia is not colonial rule, but rather the encouragement of 
native nationalisms with free and democratic institutions of their own.’ 132  The U.S. 
government’s ultimate resolve to support ‘moderate nationalism’ in Southeast Asia grew 
from intelligence assessments that such course of action would offer the best chance to 
impede communist expansion. This pragmatic viewpoint was equally reflected in the State 
Department’s decision to renew economic aid for Indonesia, which was a means to, as Kuhn 
articulated, ‘revive the output of raw materials needed by Western Europe’.133 
A couple of articles published by the journalist Walter Lippmann adopted a similarly 
pragmatic vocabulary. Lippmann stressed the profound importance of maintaining friendly 
relations between the ‘Western democracies and the emerging peoples of Asia.’ If the United 
States would ‘support puppet governments against the rising tide of nationalism’, he 
asserted, it would certainly lose what influence it otherwise might have had in the region.134 
Yet the reporter recognized, at the same time, that the situation was complicated ‘by the fact 
that the very same nations which in Europe are leading democracies, and our close allies, 
have been east of Suez the empires against which all of Asia is in rebellion.’ His words 
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underlined the fine line the State Department walked between continuing the existing 
alliance with Europe, and the simultaneous intention to secure good relations with the 
countries in the Far East by recognizing their nationalist aspirations.135  
The truly exceptional voice in the Washington Post belonged to the columnist Drew 
Pearson who, like Kuhn, wrote on the occurrences within the U.S. government, but whose 
approach was very different. Whereas Kuhn embodied a prime advocate of the State 
Department’s practical politics, Pearson expressed severe – but arguably justifiable – 
criticism of the U.S. policies vis-à-vis the Indonesian dispute. In an account of 8 January 
1949 he labeled the second Dutch aggression an ‘unhumanitarian’ act, and contended that 
the operations were made possible by ‘piled up American materials’ and U.S. government’s 
Marshall Plan aid.136 An article appearing in February charged the State Department with 
‘delivering fine phrases before the United Nations’, where State Department delegates had 
expressed their disapproval of the Netherlands’ intervention, while at the same time ‘playing 
footsie with the Dutch aggressors under the U.N. table’ – referring to the State 
Department’s reluctance to halt financial aid to the Netherlands.137 This line of argument was 
repeated in March, when Pearson commented that ‘while State Department spokesmen were 
making pious speeches before the U.N. against Dutch aggression … other spokesmen were 
making secret speeches to Senate leaders that they must vote [in favor of] Marshall plan 
relief to the same Dutch aggressors’.138 Pearson, unlike other Post reporters, did not hesitate 
to accentuate the Janus-faced nature of the State Department’s strategy and was, with his 
criticism of Dutch ‘unhumanitarianism’ and Washington’s opportunism, an isolated idealist.  
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Coverage of the Dutch-Indonesian question moved, in this last phase of the conflict, 
increasingly away from the archipelago’s line of fire to the battlefield within the U.S. 
government and the U.N. Security Council. The year 1949 evinced for the first time a stark 
divide between New York Times and Washington Post reportage. New York Times’ 
correspondents did not shy away from voicing their fervent disapproval with the State 
Department’s passivity in the Indonesian dispute. The journalists’ vilification of the U.S. 
government and the U.N. council was still defined by practical terms: the most pressing 
concerns were the unremitting communist threat; and, in addition, the prospect of Asian 
regionalization, which would pose an insurmountable obstacle not only to world peace but 
also to American dividends in the region. Washington Post accounts in contrast generally 
lacked much criticism or reflection, which was probably a result of the their reliance on news 
syndicates – although the paper’s adjacency to the policy-making nucleus might have 
affected their output as well. One Post reporter who did eventually touch on the State 
Department’s conduct of affairs with respect to the predicament in Indonesia out to be a 
zealous supporter of its maneuvers.  
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Conclusion 
The essence of the American reportage on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict can by no means 
be captured in a sentence, let alone in a single designation as, for example, ‘anti-colonial’.  
Perspectives on the Indonesian dispute and its two main opponents, as this thesis has 
illustrated, were highly susceptible to change. The journalists’ accounts were naturally 
determined by the availability of information, but also to a large extent by perceived United 
States’ interests, policies and worldviews.  
In the early stages of the conflict, most of the accounts on the Indonesian dispute 
were framed within a Second World War binary of allies versus ‘Japanese inspired’ 
nationalists. The frames in the subsequent period were dominated by American economic 
and strategic stakes in the region and, as the Red Scare gained impetus, the containment of 
communism. An anti-colonial framing of the conflict was in fact nearly absent.  
The Netherlands was generally sketched as a righteous nation, intent on ‘restoring 
law and order’; stabilizing the Asian region; and enlighten the people of the Indonesian 
islands. Only after the second ‘police action’ was their reputation tainted with accusations of 
‘stubbornness’ and executing policies to the detriment of the U.S. stature. The Indonesian 
nationalists, on the other end of the spectrum, were initially equated with their Japanese 
occupier. Even after this World War binary subdued, the Indonesian leadership was granted 
little credence, and the U.S. correspondents long continued to mockingly refer to the ‘so-
called republic’. The tables turned on the Republican leadership after they suppressed the 
communist Madiun uprising – but the perception of Indonesian inferiority persisted. 
Media interest increased in tandem with U.S. entanglement in the Indonesian affair, 
and much of the coverage stemmed from reporters in Washington or at the U.N. rather than 
from the archipelago. The Indonesian-related negotiations and policy-making processes 
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attracted more attention than the actual warfare. The Washington Post never even sent a 
correspondent to the Southeast Asian region.  
Throughout the four-year-conflict both Dutch and Indonesian spokesmen 
committed themselves to affecting the American press. They assumed that if the press would 
support their case, the State Department would too.  In retrospect this assumption seems 
not too far off. Although the media are obviously not in the position to stipulate policies, 
they certainly provide the parameters for political action. It is very questionably whether the 
State Department could have backed the Netherlands’ position until the beginning of 1949 if 
the media had consistently voiced their sharp disapproval. An examination of the media’s 
impact on other decolonization processes could offer a valuable comparison.  
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